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Abstract
It is often argued that hypothetic nonlocal reality responsible for nonlocal quan-
tum correlations between entangled particles cannot be consistent with relativity. I
review the most frequent arguments of that sort, explain how they can all be cir-
cumvented, and present an explicit Bohmian model of nonlocal reality (compatible
with quantum phenomena) that fully obeys the principle of relativistic covariance
and does not involve a preferred Lorentz frame.
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1 Introduction
The Bell theorem [1] shows that quantum mechanics (QM) is not compatible with local
reality. This suggests that reality might be nonlocal. The best known model of nonlocal
reality compatible with QM is provided by the Bohmian interpretation [2, 3] of nonrela-
tivistic QM. However, this particular model of nonlocal reality is not relativistic covariant.
In this sense, this model is not compatible with relativity. Moreover, it is often argued
that no model of nonlocal reality can be compatible with relativity. Or more succinctly,
that nonlocality and relativity cannot live together. Thus, many believe that the whole
idea of making nonlocal reality compatible with relativity is an impossible task.
Recently, however, an explicit relativistic-covariant version of the Bohmian interpre-
tation of QM has been introduced in [4], with some further developments presented in [5]
and [6]. This provides an explicit counterexample to various arguments that such a theory
should be impossible. But how that can be? Where do exactly the standard impossibility
arguments fail? The purpose and intention of the present paper is to answer these ques-
tions and to make this relativistic-covariant model of nonlocal reality understandable to
a general physics audience. With this intention in mind, in this paper I review some of
the main ideas presented in [4, 5, 6], and present some novel qualitative and quantitative
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insights that make the whole idea conceptually clearer. Sec. 2 is devoted to a qualitative
non-technical explanation of the main ideas, while the essential technical details of the
relativistic-covariant theory are presented in Sec. 3.
2 Conceptual issues: Frequent objections and responses
Basically, the idea of nonlocal reality asserts that nonlocal correlations between entan-
gled particles are caused by superluminal (i.e., faster than light) influences between the
entangled particles. However, it is often argued that superluminal influences are in contra-
diction with the theory of relativity. In this section I review the most frequent arguments
for this contradiction and qualitatively explain how all these arguments can be easily
circumvented. I present it as a series of objections (O) and responses (R) having a form
of a dialogue.
O: The theory of relativity implies that nothing can travel faster than light.
R: No, the theory of relativity does not imply that. The best known counterexample is
a tachyon, hypothetical particle with mass squared m2 < 0. It is a completely relativistic
object, and yet it travels only faster than light.
O: A tachyon is a purely mathematical construct. There is no evidence that it exists
in Nature.
R: Maybe it exists but we have just not yet discovered it. But that’s not what I am
trying to convince you. At the moment, my only point is that such an object, if exists, is
compatible with relativity.
O: OK, traveling faster than light may be compatible with relativity, but it leads to
logical paradoxes. If a signal travels faster than light, then there is a Lorentz frame in
which it travels backwards in time. Then I can send a message to the past, which may
change the past making it incompatible with the presence. For instance, I can send a
signal that would cause killing of my grandfather, which would be incompatible with my
own existence.
R: You cannot do that if these superluminal signals obey deterministic laws. Namely,
if nature is deterministic, then you don’t have free will to choose to send a signal as you
wish. Instead, you can only send the predetermined signals which are consistent with all
already known facts about the presence and the past.
O: But I do have free will.
R: Actually, you have the impression of having free will. But this may be an illusion.
You cannot be aware of all processes in your brain and body. The events determined
by causes which you are not aware of may be interpreted by your consciousness as being
determined by free will, even if the true free will does not exist.
O: OK, maybe I don’t have a true free will, but at least I have a very persuasive illusion
of free will. For all practical purposes this effective free will cannot be distinguished from
a true one. And from all my experience I know that this effective free will may influence
the future but not the past. Isn’t that an evidence that signals to the past do not exist?
R: Well, it may be that superluminal signals are of a different nature than ordinary
signals, such that humans simply cannot be aware of the existence of superluminal signals.
O: Isn’t it quite an unnatural assumption?
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R: Actually, it is quite natural. Humans are macroscopic beings who perceive the
world in terms of classical phenomena. There is a lot of evidence, especially from the
theory of decoherence [7, 8], that macroscopic classical physics emerges from the funda-
mental microscopic quantum physics. By assumption, superluminal signals are inherently
quantum phenomena responsible for nonlocal correlations between entangled particles, so
it is quite natural to expect that their effect cannot be seen at the classical macroscopic
level at which decoherence effectively destroys the quantum correlations.
O: I am still not convinced. But to make the discussion clearer, let us avoid any
mentioning of humans, free will, and other vague stuff that are not well understood in
physical terms.
R: I agree, let us avoid it.
O: So let as assume that there is a machine programmed such that it sends a message
to the past that commands its own destruction when this message is received. To be more
specific, let ...
R: Stop, don’t even bother with the details! It cannot work because a machine is a
macroscopic classical object, and I have already explained that superluminal signals do
not work at the macroscopic classical level.
O: OK, so let us replace the “machine” with a microscopic object (consisting of a few
particles only) that behaves quantum mechanically.
R: A microscopic object cannot send a message that would contradict its own existence.
O: Why not?
R: First, because I assume that the microscopic object does not have free will, or even
an illusion of free will, to send any message it “wishes”. Second, even if I discard this
assumption, I certainly must assume that the microscopic laws are self-consistent, i.e.,
that such inconsistent systems do not appear as solutions of the mathematical equations
describing the microscopic laws.
O: Are you saying that you actually can construct such consistent microscopic laws?
R: Yes, you will see the details in the technical part of this paper.
O: OK, maybe you can achieve consistency with superluminal communication, but
let me attack the whole issue from another side. If communication is superluminal, then
there is a Lorentz frame in which it is instantaneous. If the communication is instan-
taneous in one Lorentz frame, then it is not instantaneous in any other Lorentz frame.
Therefore, there is a preferred Lorentz frame with respect to which the communication is
instantaneous. Consequently, the principle of relativity is violated.
R: This is like using the following argument on subluminal communication. If commu-
nication is subluminal, then there is a Lorentz frame in which the carrier of the message
is at rest. If it is at rest in one Lorentz frame, then it is not at rest in any other Lorentz
frame. Therefore, there is a preferred Lorentz frame with respect to which the carrier is
at rest. Consequently, the principle of relativity is violated.
O: But your argument is incorrect. It is the general law of motion that must have the
same form in any Lorentz frame. A particular solution (a particle at rest with respect
to some particular Lorentz frame) does not need to have the same form in all Lorentz
frames.
R: Exactly! But you should realize that my incorrect argument is completely analogous
to yours. In other words, your argument is incorrect for exactly the same reason. A
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particular solution (communication instantaneous with respect to some particular Lorentz
frame) does not need to have the same form in all Lorentz frames.
O: This analogy works if you exchange the roles of time and space. And you will
probably say that such an exchange should be allowed in a relativistic-covariant theory.
R: Exactly!
O: But is it compatible with the principle of causality?
R: It depends on what exactly do you mean by principle of causality. It is compatible
with determinism, i.e., with a possibility that all events are caused by some “prior” events.
However, due to the superluminal influences, “prior” does not allways need to mean “at
an earlier time”.
O: But we know that nature is causal in this latter sense, in which “prior” does mean
“at an earlier time”.
R: We know that nature is causal in this sense at the classical macroscopic level, at
which, as I already explained, superluminal influences do not exist. This type of causality
may be violated at the microscopic level.
O: But we know it isn’t. Relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) is a well-tested
microscopic theory, causal in the sense that field operators commute at spacelike distances.
This is a manifestation of the well-known fact that relativistic QFT is a local theory.
R: QFT is indeed well-tested, but it contains both local and nonlocal properties. In
particular, QFT predicts nonlocal correlations between entangled particles, and they have
been observed in many experiments (see, e.g., [9]).
O: These nonlocal correlations cannot be used for superluminal signalling.
R: That is true, but it does not imply that nonlocal correlations are not caused by
superluminal influences. It is possible that superluminal influences exist at the microscopic
level, but that they cannot be controlled at the classical macroscopic level. Of course,
QFT alone with its standard purely probabilistic interpretation certainly does not describe
such superluminal influences, but it does not exclude their existence either (unless, of
course, you assume that QFT with its standard interpretation is the ultimate theory of
everything).
O: OK, it seems that relativistic superluminal influences cannot easily be disproved
by general arguments. Perhaps you can really construct an explicit theory satisfying all
these features. (I need to see the technical part of the paper.) But even if you can, it
seems to me that a theory having all these features must be extremely unnatural and
contrived. Can your theory be derived from some simple natural principles?
R: I’m glad that you asked it, because the most remarkable part of the theory is the
fact that it follows from some rather simple and natural principles.
O: What these principles are?
R: There are four of them:
1) Take the laws of physics seriously!
2) Take spacetime seriously!
3) Take relativistic wave equations seriously!
4) Take particles seriously!
O: I must admit, these principles look simple and natural. But they also look somewhat
vague. How they lead to all these nontrivial features needed for compatibility between
superluminal influences and relativity?
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R: They are only the guiding conceptual principles, not mathematical principles, which
is why they are vague. But let me explain in more detail what I mean.
By 1) I mean that everything, including the human brain, obeys the physical laws. They
will turn out to be deterministic laws, which excludes the existence of free will. (In fact,
probabilistic laws also exclude the existence of free will, but it is less obvious, and we
shall not need it.)
By 2) I mean that time and space should be treated on an equal footing. Note that in
the usual formulation of QM, time and space are not treated on an equal footing. First,
for one particle described by the wave function ψ(x, t), the infinitesimal probability in
the usual formulation is |ψ|2d3x, while from a symmetric treatment of time and space
one expects |ψ|2d3x dt. Second, for n particles the wave function in the usual formulation
takes the form ψ(x1, . . . ,xn, t), while from a symmetric treatment of time and space one
expects ψ(x1, t1, . . . ,xn, tn). I formulate QM such that fundamental axioms involve the
expressions above in which time and space are treated symmetrically, and show that the
usual formulation corresponds to a special case.
By 3) I mean that relativistic wave functions represent something real, and that the wave
functions allways obey their wave equations. It implies that there is no collapse.
By 4) I mean that particles are pointlike objects that exist even when you don’t measure
them. A combination of this with 1), 2) and 3) above naturally leads to a relativistic
covariant version of the Bohmian interpretation of QM. It is both relativistic covariant
and nonlocal essentially because the particles are guided by wave functions which are both
relativistic invariant and nonlocal.
O: Isn’t it shown that the Bohmian interpretation requires a preferred Lorentz frame?
R: That is true in the usual formulation of the Bohmian interpretation based on the
usual formulation of QM in which time and space are not treated on an equal footing.
When QM is generalized as outlined in 2) above, then the corresponding Bohmian inter-
pretation does not longer require a preferred Lorentz frame.
O: I think I’ve got a general idea now. But I’ll not be convinced until I see the technical
details.
3 Technical details
3.1 Relativistic probabilistic interpretation
We use the relativistic notation x = {xµ} = (x0, x1, x2, x3), where x0 ≡ t is the time
coordinate and xi, i = 1, 2, 3, are the space coordinates. (The set of 3 space coordinates
is also denoted by x.) As usual in relativistic QM, we work in units h¯ = c = 1. Thus, a
1-particle wave function can be denoted by ψ(x). It is natural to introduce the spacetime
scalar product
〈ψ|ψ′〉 =
∫
d4xψ∗(x)ψ′(x), (1)
and to normalize ψ so that
〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1. (2)
Then the quantity
dP = |ψ(x)|2d4x (3)
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is naturally interpreted as probability that the particle will be found in the (infinitesimal)
4-volume d4x.
At first sight, (3) is not compatible with the usual probabilistic interpretation in the
3-space
dP(3) ∝ |ψ(x, t)|
2d3x. (4)
Nevertheless, (3) and (4) are compatible. If (3) is the fundamental a priori probability,
then (4) can be interpreted as the conditional probability, for the case in which one knows
that the particle is detected at time t. More precisely,
dP(3) =
|ψ(x, t)|2d3x
Nt
, (5)
where
Nt =
∫
d3x|ψ(x, t)|2 (6)
is the normalization factor. Since ψ is normalized so that
∫
d4x|ψ|2 = 1, we see that Nt
is also the marginal probability that the particle will be found at time t.
Can the probabilistic interpretation (3) be verified experimentally? In fact, it already
is. Namely, in practice one often measures scattering cross sections or decay widths
and lifetimes associated with spontaneous decays of unstable systems. The experimental
results are in agreement with the standard theoretical predictions. My point is that these
standard theoretical predictions actually use (3), although not explicitly. Let me explain
it. In practice one calculates the transition amplitude A, which is the wave function at
t → ∞, calculated under the assumption that the wave function at t → −∞ is known.
The energy conservation implies
A ∝ δ(Ein − Efin). (7)
Then the transition probability is proportional to
|A|2 ∝ [δ(Ein − Efin)]
2 =
T
2pi
δ(Ein − Efin), (8)
where
T =
∫
dt = 2piδ(E = 0). (9)
However, T is infinite, so the transition probability (8) does not make sense. The standard
reinterpretation is that the physical quantity is |A|2/T , which describes the transition
probability per unit time. But this is equivalent to (3), which says that
∫
d3x|ψ|2 is not
probability itself, but probability per unit time. Even though the interpretation of |A|2/T
as probability per unit time may seem plausible even without the axiom (3), such an
interpretation is better founded in axioms of QM if (3) is also accepted as one of the
axioms.
Now let us generalize it to the case on n particles. Each particle has its own space
position xa, a = 1, . . . , n, as well as its own time coordinate ta. The wave function has
the form ψ(x1, . . . , xn). This is the so-called many-time wave function [10]. Now the
fundamental probability is given by a generalization of (3)
dP = |ψ(x1, . . . , xn)|
2d4x1 · · · d
4xn. (10)
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In particular, if the first particle is detected at time t1, second particle at time t2, etc.,
then the corresponding conditional probability is given by a generalization of (5)-(6)
dP(3n) =
|ψ(x1, t1, . . . ,xn, tn)|
2d3x1 · · · d
3xn
Nt1,...,tn
, (11)
Nt1,...,tn =
∫
|ψ(x1, t1, . . . ,xn, tn)|
2d3x1 · · · d
3xn. (12)
The usual single-time probabilistic interpretation is recovered by taking the special case
t1 = · · · = tn ≡ t in (11)-(12) .
3.2 Quantum theory of measurements
Let ψ(x) be expanded as
ψ(x) =
∑
b
cbψb(x), (13)
where ψb(x) are eigenstates of some hermitian operator Bˆ on the Hilbert space of functions
of x. Let ψb(x) be normalized such that
∫
d4xψ∗b (x)ψb(x) = 1. Assume that one measures
the value of the observable B described by the hermitian operator Bˆ. In a conventional
approach to QM, one would postulate that |cb|
2 is the probability thatB will take the value
b. Nevertheless, there is no need for such a postulate because, whatever the operator Bˆ is,
this probabilistic rule can be derived from the probabilistic interpretation in the position
space (10).
To understand this, one needs to understand how a typical measuring apparatus works,
i.e., how the wave function of the measured system described by the coordinate x interacts
with the wave function of the measuring apparatus described by the coordinate y. (For
simplicity, we assume that y is a coordinate of a single particle, but essentially the same
analysis can be given by considering a more realistic case in which y is replaced by a
macroscopically large number N of particles y1, . . . , yN describing the macroscopic mea-
suring apparatus. Similarly, the same analysis can also be generalized to the case in which
x is replaced by x1, . . . , xn.) Let the wave function of the measuring apparatus for times
before the interaction be E0(y). Thus, for times x
0 and y0 before the interaction, the total
wave function is ψ(x)E0(y). But what happens after the interaction? If ψ(x) = ψb(x)
before the interaction, then the interaction must be such that after the interaction the
total wave function takes the form ψb(x)Eb(y), where Eb(y) is a macroscopic state of the
measuring apparatus, normalized so that
∫
d4y E∗b (y)Eb(y) = 1. The state Eb(y) is such
that one can say that “the measuring apparatus shows that the result of measurement
is b” when the measuring apparatus is found in that state. Schematically, the result of
interaction described above can be written as
ψb(x)E0(y)→ ψb(x)Eb(y). (14)
Of course, most interactions do not have the form (14), but only those that do can
be regarded as measurements of the observable Bˆ. The transition (14) is guided by
some linear differential equation, which means that the superposition principle is valid.
Therefore, (14) implies that for a general superposition (13) we have
∑
b
cbψb(x)E0(y)→
∑
b
cbψb(x)Eb(y) ≡ ψ(x, y). (15)
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The states Eb(y) must be macroscopically distinguishable. In practice, it means that
they do not overlap (or more realistically that their overlap is negligible), i.e., that
Eb(y)Eb′(y) ≃ 0 for b 6= b
′, (16)
for all values of y. Instead of asking “what is the probability that the measured particle
is in the state ψb(x)”, the operationally more meaningfull question is “what is the prob-
ability that the measuring apparatus will be found in the state Eb(y)”. The (marginal)
probability density for finding the particle describing the measuring apparatus at the
position y is
ρ(y) =
∫
d4xψ∗(x, y)ψ(x, y). (17)
Using (15) and (16), this becomes
ρ(y) ≃
∑
b
|cb|
2|Eb(y)|
2. (18)
Now let suppEb be the support of Eb(y), i.e., the region of y-space on which Eb(y) is not
negligible. Then, from (18), the probability that y will take a value from the support of
Eb(y) is
pb =
∫
suppEb
d4y ρ(y) ≃ |cb|
2. (19)
In other words, the probability that the measuring apparatus will be found in the state
Eb(y) is (approximately) equal to |cb|
2.
3.3 Wave equation and the Bohmian interpretation
Now we are finally ready to study an explicit quantum relativistic model of nonlocal
reality. As the simplest nontrivial example, we study a system of n spinless relativistic
non-interacting (but possibly entangled) particles. Their wave function satisfies the n-
particle Klein-Gordon equation
n∑
a=1
[∂µa∂aµ +m
2
a]ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, (20)
where we use Minkowski metric with the signature (+−−−). We introduce the relativistic
Bohmian interpretation, according to which each particle has its own trajectory Xµa (s) in
spacetime, where s is an auxiliary scalar parameter. The wave function ψ(x1, . . . , xn) does
not depend on s. By writing the complex wave function in the polar form ψ = |ψ|eiS, one
finds that the Klein-Gordon equation (20) implies a relativistic conservation equation
∂|ψ|2
∂s
+
n∑
a=1
∂aµ(|ψ|
2vµa ) = 0, (21)
where
vµa (x1, . . . , xn) ≡ −∂
µ
aS(x1, . . . , xn). (22)
This implies that it is consistent to postulate that the Bohmian trajectories are determined
by equations
dXµa (s)
ds
= vµa (X1(s), . . . , Xn(s)). (23)
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Namely, if a statistical ensemble of particles has the distribution (10) for some initial s,
then the conservation equation (21) provides that the ensemble will have the distribution
(10) for any s.
We see that the equation of motion (23) is nonlocal, because the velocity of one particle
for some value of s depends on the positions of all other particles for the same value of
s. On the other hand, we also see that the theory is relativistic covariant, because no a
priori preferred coordinate frame is involved. Both the equations of motion (20) and (23)
and the probabilistic interpretation (10) have the same form in all Lorentz frames.
As we have explained, (21) implies that particles have the same distribution of space-
time positions as predicted by the purely probabilistic interpretation (10). But what about
other measurable quantities? For example, what about the space distribution of particles
described in purely probabilistic QM by (4)? Or what about the statistical distribution
of particle velocities? In general, in the Bohmian interpretation all these other quantities
may have a distribution totally different from those predicted by purely probabilistic QM.
In particular, the Bohmian velocities of particles may exceed the velocity of light, while
purely probabilistic QM does not allow such velocities because the eigenstates e−ipµx
µ
of
the velocity operator i∂µ/m are not solutions of the Klein-Gordon equation for p
µpµ < 0.
Yet, when a quantity is measured, then the two theories have the same measurable predic-
tions. Namely, since the Bohmian interpretation is compatible with (10), the probability
that the measuring apparatus will be found in the state Eb(y) in (15) is given by (19),
which is the same as that in the purely probabilistic interpretation.
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